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COMMENTS
STARE INDECISIS: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT'S EN BANC BATTLE AGAINST
ITSELF AND BUSINESS IN LIGHTING
BALLAST CONTROL, LLC V. PHILIPS
ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORP.
RONNY VALDES
In 1998, the Federal Circuit ruled in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,
an en banc decision, that the standardof reviewfor patent claim construction
cases would be de novo. From 1998 until this year, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court had intervened to confirm, or change the standard. The
standard was challenged in an en banc case at the United States Court of
Appeal for the Federal Circuit, Lighting Ballast Control, LLC. v. Philips
Electronics North America Corp.

A key question is whether the Federal

Circuit should reconsider or overrule its en banc decisions with another en
banc decision absent interventionfrom the Supreme Court or Congress under
the foundational legal principle of stare decisis. Focusing on this key
question, this Comment examines four primary points: (1) the unknown
nature of the reach and limitations of the Federal Circuit in reconsideringor
overruling its en banc standards with another en banc decision under stare
decisis; (2) the Lighting Ballast case as a means of testing the Federal
Circuit'sperceived reach in overrulingprevious en banc decisions en banc;
(3) uniformity concerns if the Federal Circuit can overrule its own en banc
decisions with other en banc decisions absent intervention; and (4) the
negative effect a lack of uniformity in the patent law can have on businesses.
This Comment suggests that the Federal Circuit believes it can continually
establishedprecedents. Stare decisis seeks intervention to define the scope of
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review in patent claim constructionstandard, thereby eliminatingthe present
threat of the FederalCircuitacting contraryto the principles ofstare decisis.
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INTRODUCTION

Mark Twain wrote "a country without a patent office and good patent laws is just
a crab and [cannot] travel any way but sideways and backwards."' Patents today
play a vital role for businesses by giving a right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling an invention.2 Historically, courts exclusively construed the
1.
MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT 107
(1889).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2012) (classifying any party who makes, uses, or sells
a patented invention as an infringer).
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meaning of patent claims as a matter of law.3 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fedeml Circuit has jurisdiction over all appeals from district courts on patent
claim construction cases.4 In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, an en banc decision,
the Federal Circuit held that when it reviews a patent claim construction case, the
standard of review is de novo. This standard of review was controversial since its
establishment; however, until this year, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had
intervened to confirm or challenge the standard.6
Momentum eventually built to the point where in 2013 a new en banc case
challenged the Federal Circuit's de novo standard.' This challenge was significant
because it presented the first opportunity for the en banc Federal Circuit to reconsider
the de novo standard since declining to do so in the 2005 Phillips v. A WH Corp.
case.8 The opportunity for en banc review of an established en banc standard
without prior intervention is unique to the Federal Circuit as the Supreme Court has
historically played a "hands-off' role with the Federal Circuit regarding patent
cases. 9 However, this opportunity for reconsideration posed a problem because it
clashes with the fundamental legal principle of stare decisis.'o Stare decisis instructs
courts to respect previous decisions absent intervention from a higher authority

3.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372,
377, 391 (1996) (holding that the "mongrel practice" of construing patents does not
violate the 7th Amendment jury guarantee and should be left up to the judge).
4.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit jurisdiction for
appeals on all final decisions from district courts on patent matters).
5.
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (holding that the Supreme Court affirmation of the Federal Circuit's decision
in Markman v. Westview Instruments endorsed de novo review in patent claim
construction cases).
6.
See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (Mayer J., dissenting) ("[A]ny attempt to fashion a coherent standard under this
regime is pointless, as illustrated by our many failed attempts to do so, I dissent.").
7.
See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 Fed.
App'x 951, 951-52 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating three questions on en banc review: (1) if
Cybor should be overruled; (2) if deference should be afforded to any part of the
district court's claim construction; and (3) if so what deference).

8.

See Tamlin H. Bason, Federal Circuit Hears Arguments En Banc on De Novo

Review of Claim Construction, BNA (Sept. 16 2013), http://www.bna.com/federalcircuit-hears-n17179877141/ (noting that the last attempt for en banc review of the de
novo standard in Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., failed
because the judges lacked the requisite six votes).
9.
See Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
763, 765 (2008) (asserting that the Supreme Court hears about one percent of patent
cases from the Federal Circuit).
10. See generally Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans
Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[S]tare decisis is a doctrine that binds
courts to follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior tribunal.");
Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993), (asserting that
stare decisis creates statements of law binding in future cases before the same court or
an inferior court).
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thereby ensuring uniformity in the law."
This Comment argues that by taking the Lighting Ballast case en banc to
reconsider the established Cybor en banc standard, the Federal Circuit is acting
contrary to the principles of stare decisis because the panel decision already affirmed
the validity of Cybor by applying it.' 2 While stare decisis is not black letter law for
the courts, the Federal Circuit was specifically created with the purpose of ensuring
uniformity in patent law.' 3 Therefore, the risk of uncertainty for patent law as a
whole exists when the Federal Circuit is not acting in a manner that promotes
uniformity, which, in turn, negatively affects business interests.14
Part I of this Comment discusses the basics of patent litigation, patent claim
construction, and the history of the standard of review through Lighting Ballast as
well as the influence of stare decisis and uniformity in patent cases.
Part II of this Comment analyzes stare decisis in Lighting Ballast. Furthermore, it
analyzes the proper interplay between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit and
the reliance on the expertise of the Federal Circuit in patent law.
Part III recommends that the Supreme Court intervene to eliminate debate by
determining when the Federal Circuit can review en banc cases with other en banc
decisions.
This Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit is in a unique situation with the
claim construction standard of review because it lacked guidance from a higher
authority for over fifteen years, but that stare decisis must weigh heavily on a court
created to promote consistency.
I.

DECONSTRUCTING THE INFLUENCE OF STARE DECISIS, PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE COSTS OF PATENT LITIGATION.

Stare decisis has a long and rich history in the American legal system. Patent
litigation can often carry a value of millions and even billions of dollars. Patent claim
construction is a fundamental concept in patent law that is necessary in any patent
litigation. Understanding each of these concepts in basic terms is the key to

11.

See Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, 260 F.3d at 1373 (citing Restatement

(Second) Judgments § 28 cmt. b, at 275-76 to show the utility of stare decisis in
protecting parties and courts when determining the scope of statutes or rules).
12. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 F.
App'x 986, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying de novo review on a matter of a claim
construction).
13. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 2 (1981) (emphasizing that consistency and
uniformity in the patent law would serve the patent and business communities
positively).
14. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 686 (2002) ("Uniformity of law has an undeniable
intellectual appeal."). But See, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 163 (1985) ("If uniformity is desirable (as it is), so are diversity and
competition.").
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understanding the disconnect between the Federal Circuit and its Constitutional role.

A.

To Stand by Things Decided: The Role ofStare Decisis in the
American Legal System.

Stare decisis, also known as the doctrine of precedent, is intended to bind courts to
previous decisions absent intervention from a higher authority." The general rule is
that when a court has decided an issue and established a principle of law, it will
adhere to and apply that principle in all future cases with similar facts to create
stability and predictability in the court system.1 6 Stare decisis is considered
especially strong in cases of a statutory nature like patent cases. 7 Two types of stare
decisis exist: vertical stare decisis and horizontal stare decisis.' 8
Vertical stare decisis is when higher authorities review the principles established
by lower authorities and the lower authorities adhere to the higher authority's
decision.' 9 Examples include when a court of appeals panel reviews a district court
and when the Supreme Court reviews a court of appeals decision. In each instance,
the lower court is bound by the higher court precedent.20 Horizontal stare decisis is
when later courts review the principles established by a court at the same level and
are bound to follow them absent a compelling reason to overturn. 2 1 An example is
when a court of appeals hears a case en banc challenging a previous en banc
precedent decided by the same court. Absent unworkability or a directive from the
Supreme Court, under stare decisis the en banc court should adhere to the previous

15. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (separating stare decisis
into different categories that include vertical and horizontal stare decisis).
16. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)) (noting that stare decisis is the preferred course to
maintain predictability and stability); see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546
U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (stating that the basic principle of justice is that similar cases
should be decided similarly).
17.
See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (adding that stare decisis
is more important in statutory cases because "Congress is free to change this Court's
interpretation of its legislation"); see also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 645,
703-04 (1999) (clarifying that stare decisis is at its strongest in statutory cases).
18.
See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1011, 1016 n.17 (2003) (distinguishing the two types of stare decisis where one
involves a court following its own precedent and the other where the court follows
higher authority precedent).
19.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th Ed. 2009) (defining vertical stare
decisis).
20. Cf Barrett, supra note 18, at 1016 n. 17 (using the example of higher authority
precedent binding a lower authority).
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th Ed. 2009) (defining horizontal stare
decisis).
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decision of the same court en banc.22 Notably, stare decisis is not black letter law,
but rather, "a principle of policy."23 Historically, however, the role of stare decisis as
a foundational legal principle in the American system has increased its stature to a
point where courts consider it the wisest path unless a compelling reason demands
reversal.24 The value of stare decisis is that it provides valuable consistency in the
law. 25
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States with ultimate
authority over all courts, including the Federal Circuit.2 6 The Court has criticized
"lower courts" that deviate from established precedents for causing a disruption in
the expected results from the legal community.27 The Court has said that until it
considers a specific legal point, the point is not settled regardless of accepted
practices from the lower courts.2 8 The Court warns that "lower courts" should be
cautious when creating new rules that differ from established precedent.29 The Court
prefers preserving uniformity in the law, especially in patent law.30

22.
Cf Barrett, supra note 18, at 1016 n.17 (illustrating the precedent decided by
the old court binding the new court absent some determination of unworkability or
another factor).
23.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
24. See Lee, supra note 17, at 652-54 (comparing the policy considerations when
choosing to apply stare decisis).
25.
See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because
it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.").
26.
Cf U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the Supreme Court as the only federal
court required by the Constitution).
27.
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002) (chastising the Federal Circuit for ignoring the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. because it would "disrupt the settled expectations of
the inventing community").
28.
See, e.g., Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716 (1888) ("A question arising in
regard to the construction of a statute of the United States concerning patents for
inventions cannot be regarded as judicially settled when it has not been so settled by
the highest judicial authority which can pass upon the question.").
29.
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29,
(1997) (noting that application of established doctrines should not be given latitude to
be changed at will or eliminated); see also Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (recognizing that as a federal court, the
statements made by the Supreme Court cannot be easily thrown away as dicta but are in
fact binding).
30.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)
(referencing the importance of uniformity and the patent law and Congress' recognition
of that importance in establishing the Federal Circuit); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43
at 309 (B. Wright Ed. 1961) (emphasizing that the purpose behind the Patent and
Copyright Clauses of Constitution was to unify the intellectual property law at the
federal level).
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Stare decisis is also important for businesses because it provides a consistent
standard for the business community to rely upon.3 1 Given that patent law is a
commercially based field, courts relying on prior decisions and standards absent
higher intervention create certainty for businesses. 32 Unifofmity concerns go handin-hand with consistency and must be applied in specific courts, like the Federal
Circuit that was granted exclusive jurisdiction over patent law appeals, in order to
promote uniformity.33
B.

Flexing the Monopolistic Muscle: Patent Value, Infringement Suits,
and Claim Construction.

The three primary parts of a patent are the specification, the drawings, and the
claims.34 Arguably, the most important part of a patent is the set of claims at the end
of the specification, which delineate the subject matter of the invention and serve as
the metes and bounds of the rights granted.3 Once a patent has been issued, it
carries a presumption of validity until proven otherwise through a judicial
determination. 36
In today's economy, patents of all kinds have become increasingly valuable for
businesses. 37 Businesses can use patents in many ways. Licensing opportunities can
create consistent revenue streams for a business, and building strong patent portfolios
can increase a business' market power.38 However, some of the businesses that fall
under the subset known as non-practicing entitites ("NPEs") focus less on using
31. See Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance,
and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1515, 1565 (1998) ("[U]nderlying the
doctrine of stare decisis is the principle of protecting justifiable reliance upon
established law.").
32. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (offering the
example of certainty in sales and use taxes as a settled expectation for businesses and
encouraging investment).
33. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (demonstrating the unique situation of the
Federal Circuit which has jurisdiction by subject matter rather than geography making
it the only specialized court of appeals).
34.
See ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, I ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST (MATTHEWS) sec.
1:21 (2013) (showing the components in a patent application).
35. See id. (noting that victory in infringement cases can depend wholly on the
interpretation of the claims).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (noting that each claim of the patent is
presumed valid despite dependence on other claims).
37. See, e.g., Paul S. Hunter, The Importance ofPatents, LABORATORYNEWS (July
1, 2005), http://www.labnews.co.uk/features/the-importance-of-patents/ (noting that
patents can provide freedom of movement in particular fields and licensing
opportunities).
38. See Joe Hadzima, The Importance of Patents: It Pays to Know Patent
Regulations,
MIT
ENTER.
FORUM,
http://www.mitef.org/s/1314/interior-2col.aspx?sid=1314&gid=5&pgid=5784 (declaring that many companies see strong
patent portfolios as a key to success even if their focus is not on enforcement but
instead on cross-licensing).
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patents and more on enforcing and litigating the patents for money.39 The curtrent
economic trends indicate that the role of patents in business will continue to grow
moving forward.40
Following issuance of the patent, the patent owner ("patentee") may bring a patent
infringement claim against any party he believes is violating the exclusive rights
given when the patent issued.4 1 The grant of a patent gives the patentee the right to
exclude any party from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention
without the permission of the patentee.4 2 Accused infringers are required to plead
non-infringement and invalidity of the patent as defenses.43 Accused infringers
pleading invalidity generally seek to render one or all of the claims of the patent
invalid under one of the patentability standards, which precludes infringement.4 4
Relief for a patentee can come in two forms: equitable relief, which includes
temporary or permanent injunctions, and compensatory money damages. 4 5 In order
to prove whether the patent is invalid or whether relief for the patentee is proper, the
court must construe the meaning of the claims in the patent to determine what the
patent covers.46 This process is called claim construction.
In patent claim construction, judicial entities determine the scope and meaning of
the words in the claims to a person with ordinary skill in the art.47 Patent claim
39.

See Ghyo Sun Park & Seong Don Hwang, The Rise of the NPE, MANAGING
1, 2010), http://www.managingip.com/Article/2740039/
The-rise-of-the-NPE.html (defining NPE as "a company that acquires patents or patent
rights and that generates revenue by monetising those patents without manufacturing or
using the patented invention(s)").
INTELLECTUAL PROP. (Dec.

40.
See THE CHANGING FACE OF US PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS
STRATEGY 2 (Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald eds., 2012) (asserting there is reason

to believe the role of the patent system in relation to business will increase in the future
based on the strong rise of issued patents since 2011).
41. See MATTHEWS, supra note 34, at sec. 9:1 (mentioning that most patent
infringement litigation arises when the invention has great commercial value).
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(c) (2012) (expanding the basic definition of infringer
from subsection (a) in subsections (b) and (c) where it discusses inducement of
infringement and contributory infringement).
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1)-(3) (2012) (stating that invalidity defenses apply for
patentability standards like novelty and specific section 112 standards like written
description).
44. See Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 991
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding the issue of infringement is moot if a patent is declared
invalid).
45. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2012) (establishing that courts apply injunctions for
a time they deem reasonable and that the court will assess damages if the jury does
not).
46. See Markman v. Westview Instruments (Markman 1), 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (determining that for the purposes of claim construction, the
written description can serve as a dictionary for terms appearing in the claims).
47. See Pall Corp. v. Hemasure, Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(accepting that technical terms will be accorded the ordinary meaning they have in their
field of invention); see also Netword LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352
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construction typically occurs as an initial step in patent infringement sits.4 8 The
Supreme Court held in MarknanHlthat claim construction was a matter of law to be
performed by the courts, not the jury, affirming the decision of the Federal Circuit.49
Claim construction begins with the district court holding a pre-trial evidentiary
hearing called a "Marlananhearing", where patent documents are reviewed, experts
testify, and parties make arguments regarding the scope of the claimi 0 Courts use
two types of evidence to construe claims: intrinsic evidence and extrinsic evidence.
Intrinsic evidence consists of "the claims, the specification, and the prosecution
history".52 Extrinsic evidence consists of all forms of evidence unrelated to the
patent document including, technical treatises, dictionaries, and expert testimony.53
Many courts prefer to use intrinsic evidence as the primary tool of analysis
because it is the evidence best suited to provide context into the meaning of terms in
the claims. 54 Some patent judges disagree as to whether all forms of intrinsic
evidence should be considered, or if only the claims should be considered. 5 Judges
consider extrinsic evidence when the intrinsic evidence does not clearly and
unambiguously give meaning to the disputed terms in the patent claims. 56 Courts
will generally allow reliance on extrinsic evidence to understand how a technology
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting the intention of claim construction is not to broaden or narrow
claims but to define them).
48. See Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(explaining that the preliminary claim construction is reviewed at the injunction stage
for correctness).
49. See Markman v. Westview Instruments (Markman 11), 517 U.S. 370, 378, 39091 (1996) (characterizing claim construction as a "mongrel practice" that required
special training possessed by the judge not the jury).
50. Cf EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 891-92 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (explaining that many difficult infringement cases are resolved during Markman
hearings).
51. See Markman 1, 52 F.3d at 979-80 (citing precedent describing intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence).
52. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(citing Locite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
53. See Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980 (describing the utility of extrinsic evidence in
claim construction analyses).
54. See Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, P.L.C., 403 F.3d 1364, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
55. See, e.g., Jakub Michna, Is the Scope ofa Patent'sCoverage Determinedby its
Claims, or by its Specification? Top Patent Judges Disagree, SUNSTEIN, KANN,
MURPHY & TIMBERs LLP, http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/is-the-scope-of-a-patentscoverage-determined-by-its-claims-or-by-its-specification-top-patent-judges-disagree/
(discussing Judge Lourie's dissent in Arlington Industries, Inc. v. BridgeportFittings,
Inc. as an example of Federal Circuit judge disagreement on the role of the
specification in claim construction).
56. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(determining that the district court unnecessarily relied on extrinsic evidence when the
specification clearly defined the terms in the claims).
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works. 7 Some courts view expert testimony during claim construction with
skepticism and generally prefer to rely on dictionaries or legal treatises when
neeed. 58

Both patent litigation and the claim construction process have great economic
costs on businesses. 59 Businesses spend large amounts of money combating NPEs
who can block a business' production and sale of products with a single patent over a
small component and a patent infringement lawsuit.60 Businesses tend to settle cases
and agree to pay licensing fees to NPEs because the enormous cost of litigating
dissuades businesses from pursuing litigation.6 1 Additionally, for businesses that
own patents, an adverse construction of claims in litigation can lead to patents being
rendered invalid thereby eliminating all claims of infringement from a competitor.62
Factored together, litigation and claim construction can be disastrous to business and
have led some to classify the patent system as a burden on business.63
C.

DecliningDeference: De Novo Review at the FederalCircuit

Patent claim construction was historically subject to de novo review at the Federal
Circuit, meaning that the Federal Circuit was not required to offer any deference to
the claim construction determinations made by the district court.64 The roots of de

57.
See, e.g., id. (stating the district court could use extrinsic evidence to
understand how the technology worked).
58.
See, e.g., id. (expressing that testimony on construction of claims is acceptable
only if the patent documents are insufficient to allow a court to make a determination
of meaning for a disputed term in the claims).
59.
See, e.g., David Thier, More Than $20 Billion Spent on Patent Litigation In
Two Years, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidthier/
2012/10/08/in-two-years-the-smartphone-industry-has-spent-more-than-20-billionspent-on-patent-litigation/ (quoting a New York Times article which states that $20
billion was spent by the smartphone industry on patent litigation between 2010 and
2012).
60.
See Charles E. Schumer, A Strategyfor Combating Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J.
(June 12, 2013, 6:59 PM), http://www.online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
127887323844804578531021238656366 (voicing concern because in 2011 U.S.
companies paid $29 billion in litigation costs and settlements to NPEs).
61.
See id. (comparing patent litigation to a highway with two exits both of which
carry a heavy toll).
62.
See, e.g., Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978,
991 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding one of the patents at issue invalid thereby eliminating
infringement claims).
63.
See THE CHANGING FACE OF US PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS
STRATEGY 4 (Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald eds., 2012) (offering a critique from
Judge Richard Posner who claims most industries would be fine without patent
protection).
64. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (concluding that the de novo standard of review from the Federal Circuit's
decision in Markman I was still good law because the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision).
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novo review at the Federal Circuit are found in the Supreme Court's Markman II
decision.65 The focus of this case was whether patent claim construction was a
matter of law for judges to decide or a matter of fact subject to the Seventh
Amendment jury guarantee. 66 The Court decided that infringement determinations
were for the jury as a matter of fact but that claim construction was for the judge as a
matter of law.6 7 The Court stressed that uniformity in patent law was important, and
that judges were better suited to make deterninations regarding the meaning of terms
in a legal document.68 Prior to the Supreme Court decision, the Federal Circuit had
ruled that the proper appellate standard of review for patent claim construction cases
was de novo.69 The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision but made
no mention of what the proper standard of review for patent claim construction
should be.
The Federal Circuit firmly established de novo review as the standard for patent
claim construction appeals in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies." Prior to the
decision in Cybor, some Federal Circuit panels had already been applying the de
novo standard of review in claim construction appeals using the Federal Circuit's
determination in Markman 1.72 However, other panels had applied a clear error
standard to findings considered factual in nature and incident to the construction of
patents. 7 3 Instead of allowing a panel ruling, the Federal Circuit decided sua sponte
to hear Cybor en banc in order to clarify the standard of review question.74 The en
65.
66.

517 U.S. 370 (1996).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (guaranteeing a jury trial for all suits at common

law with a value exceeding twenty dollars); Markman II, 517 U.S. at 376 (summarizing
that both lower courts held that claim construction was within the realm of the court).
67. See Markman II, 517 U.S. at 377, 390 (recognizing the importance of the 7th
Amendment jury guarantee, but refusing to extend that protection to patent claim
construction). See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)
(claiming the line between questions of law and fact as vexing).
68. See Markman II, 517 U.S. at 381-82. 388-89 (recounting the history of 18th
century English judges making determinations on patents and holding that judges
through training are more likely to give the correct interpretation).
69. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 974-75, 979 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (establishing that because claim construction is a matter of law, the
review of the claim construction by the appellate court must be de novo).
70. See Markman II, 517 U.S. at 391 (demonstrating silence on the proper standard
of review despite affirming the Federal Circuit's opinion).
71.
138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
72. See, e.g., Serrano v. Telular Corp., Ill F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(applying the de novo standard to a claim construction case).
73. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying a limited clear error standard as to the use of
extrinsic evidence in claim construction), abrogated by Cybor Corp v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
74.
See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1450 (noting that the panel assigned to the case heard
oral argument, however, the court decided to hear the case en banc, prior to the opinion
issuing).
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banc Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in MarlananII served as
an endorsement of the Federal Circuit's assertion in Marlanan I: that the proper
standard of review for all aspects of claim construction was de novo." Judge Mayer
dissented stating that the Supreme Court intended to affirmi that claim construction
76
itself was a matter of law for the judge, not to adopt any standard of review.
Following Cybor, the Federal Circuit routinely applied the de novo standard of
review and a challenge to the standard was not accepted en banc until 2005 in
Phillips v. A WH Corp.77

The Federal Circuit asked the parties to brief seven

questions, the final of which was whether it was appropriate for the court to give any
deference to the district court claim construction under both Marknan cases and
Cybor.78 After much fanfare, the en banc court in Phillipsdecided not to address the
issue of de novo review at the time and left the standard established by Cybor
untouched.79 Judge Mayer again dissented stating his belief that the de novo
standard for claim construction at the Federal Circuit was absurd.o Following
Phillips, there was no Supreme Court intervention on the matter, as certiorari was
denied.8 ' Later attempts challenging the Cybor standard of review were denied en
banc rehearings by the Federal Circuit.82 In a dissent to the denial of rehearing en
banc in Retractable Technologies, Judge Moore asserted that claim construction is
the most important part of patent litigation and that the Federal Circuit's de novo
standard is confusing and unworkable.83
The de novo standard of review has been characterized as substituting uniformity
for procedural efficiency of the courts.84 Furthermore, businesses have criticized the
75.
See id. at 1455-56 (claiming that Markman II implied that the totality of claim
construction is a matter of law including the standard of review).
See id. at 1464 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (asserting that Markman II only decided
76.
that claim construction was a matter of law as a matter of policy).
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
77.
78. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting
rehearing en banc).
79. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328 ("After consideration of the matter, we have
decided not to address that issue at this time. We therefore leave undisturbed our prior
en banc decision in Cybor.").
80. See id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am convinced
of the futility .. . in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law
devoid of any factual component.").
81. See AWH Corp. v. Phillips, 546 U.S. 1170, 1170 (2006) (denying certiorari
without explanation).
82. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 659 F.3d
1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (denying rehearing en banc).
83. See id. at 1370 (Moore J., dissenting) ("Despite the crucial role that claim
construction plays in patent litigation, our rules are still ill-defined and inconsistently
applied, even by us.").
84. See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation:
Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 124 (2000) (claiming this
trade-off makes it unlikely the matter will be definitively solved).
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de novo standard because they claim it increases litigation costs, as the possibility of
appellate review and reversal followed by a remand is greater because no deference
is offered to the claim construction of the district court." The general sentiment
from businesses is that allowing the de novo standard of review creates uncertainty in
patent litigation, which, in turn, creates higher costs for businesses due to increased
litigation and less inclination to settle.86
The potential for change in the standard of review arose again in 2013 when the
Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Lighting Ballast Control v. Phihps
Electronics.87 This case represented the first opportunity to revisit the Cybor
standard of review en banc since the Phillips case and the denial of rehearing in
Retractable Technologies.88
D.

Light at the End of the Tunnel?: Lighting BallastHistory and Issues

The origins of the en banc rehearing of Lighting Ballast trace back to a dispute
between the parties over infringement, the scope of a "control means" claim
limitation, the meaning of the term "connected to" in the patent, and validity of the
patent overall." Lighting Ballast Control's (LBC) patent covers "a lighting ballast
that powers fluorescent lamps with heatable filaments." 90 The district court went
through the claim construction analysis looking at intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to
ascertain the meaning of "connected to" and other claim limitations.91 As required
by statute, Universal Lighting Technologies (ULT), the true defendant despite the
case being named for Philips Electronics, brought up an invalidity defense claiming

85. See Paul R. Michel, The Court ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit Must Evolve
to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1193 (1999) (explaining that in
patent cases the appeal rate hovered around fifty percent compared to ten percent of
other civil judgments). But See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal
Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim
Construction, 108 Nw U. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2014) (explaining that the rate of reversal in
claim construction cases today is closer to the rate of reversal in other patent issues).
86. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 85, at 70 (citing multiple precedents that
suggest the de novo standard encourages appeals and multiplies proceedings); see also
James F. Holderman, The Patent Litigation Predicamentin the United States, 2007 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH & POL'Y 1, 11 (2007) (identifying the de novo standard as one factor that
create uncertainty in patent litigation).
87.
Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F. App'x
951, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting rehearing en banc).
88. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1370 (denying rehearing en banc).
89. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 814 F.
Supp. 2d 665, 671 (N.D. Tex. 2011), rev'd, 498 F. App'x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (listing
the seven grounds under which ULT moved for judgment as a matter of law).
90. Id. at 670 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,436,529 (filed Apr. 22, 1993)).
91. See id. at 675-83 (analyzing the claims, specification, prosecution history, and
expert testimony from the "connected to" limitation and the "control means
limitation").
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LBC's patent was invalidated by prior art. 2 The district court held, after construing
the claims, that the patent was valid and therefore, the subsequent jury verdict on
infringement would stand.93 The jury decided that ULT did infringe and awarded
damages to LBC.94
ULT appealed the case to the Federal Circuit where a three-judge panel reversed
the district court, holding the patent was invalid because it was indefinite. 95 The
panel made a point to mention that matters of claim constmuction are matters of law,
which required it to offer no deference to the determinations of the district court.96
The panel focused on an entirely different part of the patent than the district court in
deciding the appeal, rendering the claim construction by the district court essentially
useless.97
Following the reversal, LBC appealed for a rehearing of the case en banc arguing
that the Cybor standard of review should be overturned. 98 The Federal Circuit
granted the rehearing en banc and heard oral argument on the case on September 13,
2013, with a good portion of the argument focusing on whether and why the Cybor
standard should be overtumed.99 LBC argued that the de novo standard should be
abandoned entirely and a clear error standard should be implemented.' 0 0 ULT
92.

See id. at 686-87 (claiming that the '529 patent is invalid because a large

amount of uncontested evidence exists and on the contested evidence the arguments
from LBC conflict with the claim language and even LBC's own infringement claims).
93.
See id. at 689-90 (holding that the '529 patent is not invalidated by either the
Japanese '997 patent or '799 patent).
94. See id. at 670-71, 691, 693 (allowing the jury's award of $3,000,000 in
damages to stand and granting the amount as a lump sum payment in exchange for a
license for ULT to use the '529 from the date judgment is entered until the patent
expires).
95.
See Lighting Ballast Control LLC. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 F.
App'x 986, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (providing an example of the Federal Circuit
overruling a district court holding on a matter entirely different than what the district
court considered essential to the decision).
96.
See id. at 989 (citing the Cybor case which allows the de novo standard to
apply to questions of law, requiring no deference).
97.
See id. at 989-91 (focusing on the means-plus-function limitation in the claim
I term "voltage source means").
98.
See Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6-11, Lighting Ballast Control LLC. v.
Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F. App'x 951 (2013) (Nos. 2012-1014, 2012-1015)
(applying the facts of Lighting Ballast at the district court level to argue that Cybor
forces Federal Circuit panels to re-review factual conclusions).
99.
See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC. v. Philips Elecs. N. America Corp., 500 F.
App'x 951, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting rehearing en banc); see also J. Jonas
Anderson, Oral Argument Recap: Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips, PATENTLYO
(Sept.
13, 2013),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/09/oral-argument-recaplighting-ballast-control-v-philips.html (noting that at oral argument both parties
initially agreed de novo was not the proper standard of review with the parties differing
on the necessary scope of deference).
100. See Anderson, supra note 99 (detailing LBC's desire for deference on all
aspects of patent claim construction).
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initially argued that the de novo standard could change but only to offer deference on
issues of historical fact.1o' The argument explored three primary issues: national
uniformity concerns, line-drawing between issues of fact and issues of law, and
interestingly, the impact of stare decisiS.1 02 Judge Taranto made a point to ask ULT
and the Patent Office Solicitor whether the Federal Circuit is able to revisit an
established en banc precedent through another en banc decision absent statutory
intervention from Congress or judicial intervention from the Supreme Court.' 0 3
Neither the ULT attorney nor the Solicitor arguing before the Federal Circuit
appeared to have an answer to this question, suggesting it was up to the court to
make that determination. 104 The question from Judge Taranto was deliberate
because precedent, or stare decisis, is a foundational legal principle in the American
system. 0 5
E.

Harmony in the Law and the Courts: The Influence of Uniformity on
the FederalCircuit

When Congress established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1982, one of its primary reasons was to create uniformity in patent law.1 0 6
Before 1982, every federal court of appeal had jurisdiction over patent appeals from
district courts in their territory.' 07 Wide ranging jurisdiction also created many
instances of forun shopping, which Congress wanted to eradicate.'0o Furthermore,
prior to the Federal Circuit's establishment, only the Supreme Court was able to

101. See id. (demonstrating ULT's desire for a narrow application of deference).
102. See id. (explaining that the stare decisis issue seemingly took the arguing
attorneys by surprise).
103. See Oral Argument at 21:54, 55:53, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips
Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), available at
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2012-1014_9132013.mp3
(manifesting Judge Taranto's hesitation at overruling established en banc precedents
under stare decisis).
104. See id. at 22:24, 56:10 (demonstrating the two attorneys' surprise at the
question of stare decisis implications inherent to the decision of the case).
105. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.").
106. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 2 (1981) (recognizing two other purposes in creating
the Federal Circuit: to improve the administration of patent law); see also H.R. REP.
No. 97-312 at 20-23 (1981) (explaining that forum shopping was also a problem that
created wide inconsistencies in the patent law).
107. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) (granting jurisdiction to district courts over patent
cases which at the time could then be appealed to the regional federal courts of appeal).
108. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 5 (1981) (discussing how a court of appeals
dedicated to patent law will reduce forum shopping which was common in patent
litigation).
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render binding decisions on national law issues like patent law.' 09 Concerns arose
that the appellate courts were overburdened by patent cases because their nature was
technical, and required extensive amounts of time." o
Uniformity in patent law is necessary for the same reason adherence to stare
decisis is promoted at the Federal Circuit, namely, the powerful role of the Federal
Circuit as the exclusive holder of patent appellate jurisdiction."' This key factor
distinguishes the Federal Circuit from the other courts of appeal because its
jurisdiction was purposely defined by subject matter instead of geography.1 2 The
Supreme Court initially was hands-off and allowed the Federal Circuit to make the
major pronouncements on patent law without frequent challenges.1 3 In recent years,
the Court's role has increased and some Federal Court judges like Judge Dyk believe
the role of the Court will continue to increase going forward." 14
Congress greatly considered the needs of businesses in establishing the Federal
Circuit by asserting that uniformity in patent law created by the Federal Circuit
would be an improvement for businesses over the old system.'" Congress
recognized the important nature of patents as a driving force of innovation where
significant investment was placed in research, development, and distribution of
products.1 6 Congress' aim was to reduce uncertainty in order to promote
investment."' Judge Dyk notes that, in the 1970s, experts estimated the breakdown
of assets in American corporations was twenty percent intellectual property and
109. See id. (emphasizing the need for the Federal Circuit to address the inability to
provide "quick and definitive answers to legal questions of nationwide significance").
I 10. See Ellen F. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Court Improvement Act: A
Practitioner'sPerspective, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 385, 388-89 (1984) (concluding that the
centralization of patent case jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit would lead to the
beneficial effect of lightening other circuits' case load).
111. Cf Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The
Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 791, 805 (1998) (presenting the idea that in many
patent cases, the Federal Circuit can serve as the court of last resort since the Supreme
Court often denies certiorari in patent cases).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (enumerating the Federal Circuit's unique status
as having nationwide jurisdiction of patent appeals from Article Ill courts).
113. See Dyk, supra note 9, at 764 (noting that in the first ten years of the Federal
Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court only reviewed three patent decisions).
114. See id. at 764-65 (explaining the recent increase in Supreme Court cases
reviewing patent cases from the Federal Circuit).
115. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 6 (1981) (noting that uniformity will make business
planning easier and more stable, as predictable law becomes the norm).
116. See id. (quoting the general patent counsel of GE, "Patents, in my judgment,
are a stimulus to the innovative process, which includes not only investment in research
and development but also a far greater investment in facilities for producing and
distributing the goods").
117. See id. (quoting the general patent counsel of GE, "Certainly it is important to
those who must make these investment decisions that we decrease unnecessary
uncertainties in the patent system").
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eighty percent hard assets."' Today, those same experts assert that the proportions
have been reversed with intellectual property playing a greater role in the corporate
community.119 Businesses plan around consistent applications of law, and with the
strong economic impact patent litigation can have, uniformity in the law is critical. 12 0
However, all of this could be threatened by a potential oveneach by the Federal
Circuit if it is allowed to reconsider established en banc standards at will with new en
banc cases.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ADHERENCE TO STARE INDECISIS:
RECONSIDERING EN BANC STANDARDS EN BANC AND THE NEGATIVE
RESULT ON BUSINESS LITIGATION STRATEGIES

Throughout its history, the Federal Circuit has valued its role as a pseudo-court of
last resort for patent claims. However, the very purposes for creating the Federal
Circuit preclude allowing the court to constantly review its own established en banc
standards without input from the Supreme Court or Congress. For a specialized court
that values uniformity in law, stare decisis must play a greater role.
A.

Slipping Down the Slope: ReconsideringEstablishedEn Banc
StandardsAbsent Judicialor Statutory Intervention.

The principle of stare decisis guides a court like the Federal Circuit more than
other courts because of the importance of uniformity and consistency concerns and
the statutory nature of patent law interpretation.121 While stare decisis is not black
letter law, the Federal Circuit has purposefully ignored this important principle by
twice reconsidering the en banc Cybor standard prior to any judicial or statutory
intervention from a higher authority. 12 2 The Federal Circuit's rejection of stare
decisis by giving itself the opportunity to reconsider established en banc standards at
will with other en banc cases ironically creates a dangerous precedent.1 23
Other federal courts of appeal typically do not face a problem of reconsidering
118. See Dyk, supra note 9, at 766 (citing Ocean Tomo 300 Patent Index,
http://www.oceantomo.com/productsandservices/investments/indexes/ot300
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2014)) (delineating visually the percentages of tangible versus
intangible assets from 1975 to 2010).
119. See id.
120. See Thier, supra note 59 (noting that many times small companies with fewer
resources can be shut out of the patent community through attrition).
121. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (emphasizing that
compelling reasons such as irreconcilability with other doctrines is needed to overturn
prior precedent).
122. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F.
App'x 951, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting rehearing en banc); accord Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc).
123. Cf Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (demonstrating an en banc court overruling a panel precedent as is the
normal course of action).
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their own en banc precedents twice in a fifteen-year period because intervention from
a higher authority will resolve the issue. 124 The Supreme Court can and often does
resolve circuit splits in all areas of the law because circuit splits are one of the three
primary considerations for the Court when deciding which cases to hear.1 2 5
However, with intra-circuit splits, which are splits between multiple panels of an
appeals court, the split is typically resolved by an appeals court hearing the case en
banc.1 26 The Supreme Court may choose to and has rendered many decisions on
appeals from en banc decisions in cases where the issue of law is particularly
relevant. 27
Patent law appears to receive different treatment from the Supreme Court because
in the past, the Court has not taken many patent cases.' 2 8 Numbers do show that the
Court's interest in patent cases is growing as the percentage of Supreme Court patent
cases in the last seven years has increased.1 29 For example in 2014 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to at least six patent cases.1 30 Yet, when the issue of the
patent claim construction de novo standard of review arose, the Court balked and the
jurisprudence is littered with denials of certiorari.' 3 ' The Federal Circuit claimed
multiple times that the Supreme Court clearly supported the de novo standard
because it affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision in Marlanan1 however, the reality
124. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Supreme Court Upends Top Patent Court's "Burden of
Proof" Rule, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 22, 2014 4:19 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/01/supreme-court-upends-top-patent-courts-burden-of-proof-rule/
(providing an example of the Supreme Court intervening to resolve an issue); Lee
Smith, Congress Passes Legislation to Overturn the Federal Circuit's GPX Decision,
http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/
2012),
(Apr.
& SPALDING
KING
TradeManufacturing Alert/2012/April/article2.html (providing an example of Congress
intervening to resolve an issue).
125. SUP. CT. R. 10 (2010) (stating that the two other primary considerations are if a
state court of last resort has decided a federal question that conflicts with another state
court of last resort or if a state court of last resort has decided a question of federal law
that should be settled by the Supreme Court).
126. Cf Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of
Appeal, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 17, 18 (2009) (establishing that subsequent panels cannot
overrule prior panels' decisions; only the en banc court has that ability).
127. See, e.g., Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012) (serving as an example of
the Supreme Court considering the limits on introduction of evidence as a relevant
issues of federal law).
128. See Dyk, supra note 9, at 765 (using an example from 2006 to show that the
Supreme Court only hears as much as one percent of patent cases that come out of the
Federal Circuit).
129. See id. (stating that in 2007, the term prior to the article, the Supreme Court
had three patent cases, which constituted four and a half percent of the cases decided by
the Court).
130. See Patent Law and the Supreme Court: Certiorari Petitions Granted,
WILMERIHALE LLP (Jan. 2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publications
andnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubld= 10737419833.
131. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 133 S. Ct. 833
(2013) (denying certiorari).
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is that prior to Teva Pharmaceuticalsv. Sandoz in 2014, the Supreme Court never
directly addressed the patent claim construction standard of review.1 3 2 The issue is
further complicated because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals and without intervention from the Court, the Federal Circuit's decisions are
the controlling law making it a pseudo-court of last resort.133
The hands-off approach on the issue of claim construction by the Supreme Court
has allowed the Federal Circuit to operate independently and create tension on the
issue of claim construction among the different judges.1 34 This same tension has
arisen in other subject areas like patentable subject matter and software patents.' 35
Notably, absent was any intervention from the Supreme Court on the claim
construction standard of review issue.' 36 This absence of intervention on this specific
issue changed when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Teva Pharmaceuticas
v. Sandoz.1 37 But, the entire problem at issue here finds its roots from a subjective
interpretation of a Supreme Court decision.1 3 8
In Cybor, the Federal Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's silence as an
indication that the Court approved of the de novo standard announced by the Federal
Circuit's Markman decision. 3 9 However, the Supreme Court had not yet weighed
in on the issue, and an issue is not fully decided until the Court has decided what the
132. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (offering
neither support nor rejection of the Federal Circuit's de novo standard of review but
merely offering silence).
133. See Michael Paul Chu, Note, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of
PredatoryPatentInfringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1351 (1992)
("The Federal Circuit is effectively the court of last resort for patent appeals because
very few patents reach the Supreme Court.").
134. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 85, at 6 (proffering that a lack of
agreement among the judges on whether Markman implied that claim construction has
factual determinations has created more confusion and uncertainty in the patent
system).
135. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353-54 (2014)
(presenting a case where the Court addressed software patents en bane and multiple
judges wrote opinions); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2114-15 (2012) (presenting a case where the Court addressed patentable subject
matter and all three judges on the panel wrote opinions); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010) (presenting a case where the Court addressed software patents).
136. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 133 S. Ct. 833
(2013) (denying certiorari); AWH Corp. v. Phillips, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006) (denying
certiorari) (demonstrating the inference that Supreme Court lacked interest thus far in
resolving the standard of review issue).
137. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014) (serving as the
first case where the Supreme Court has agreed to consider the proper claim
construction standard of review at the Federal Circuit).
138. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (assuming that the affirmation of the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman I
means the Supreme Court endorsed the de novo standard of review).
139. See id. (implying that the unanimous nature of the Supreme Court's vote in
Markman II played a role in deciding Cybor).
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law really means. Therefore, there was room for debate.1 40 The Supreme Court's
Marlanan H decision made no references to the proper standard of review and
instead, classified claim construction as a "mongrel practice" that is neither purely
factual nor purely legal.141 In the wake of that decision and before Cybor, some
Federal Circuit panels still applied clear error implying that Marknan H did not
elucidate a clear standard of review.1 42 Often, different entities will extoll the virtues
of one standard over another, but the more important issue is that the Supreme Court
has failed the intra-circuit split at the Federal Circuit, created by the dissents in en
banc cases, and allowed it to reconsider its established en banc standards at will.' 43
The issue of the correct standard of review was resolved by the Supreme Court in
Teva, but it only serves a minimal purpose because it leaves unanswered the stare
decisis questions presented here.1 4 4 Teva was decided at the Federal Circuit with no
references to stare decisis.1 4 5 At the Supreme Court, neither at oral argument nor in
its opinion was stare decisis mentioned.1 46 The scope of the Federal Circuit's ability
to constantly reconsider established en banc standards would be ripe for review in
47
Lighting Ballast because the decision was based on a stare decisis determination.1
It is important for the Supreme Court to consider why the Federal Circuit, a court
founded on uniformity principles, believes it has the unquestionable right to

140. See Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716 (1888) ("A question arising . .
cannot be regarded as judicially settled when it has not been so settled by the highest
judicial authority which can pass upon the question.").
141. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 378, 386 (1996)
(referring to claim construction as a mixed question of law and fact where judges tell
juries which law governs the reasoning).
142. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1558
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating a district court determination may not be overruled unless
there is an erroneous interpretation of law or erroneous facts), abrogated by Cybor
Corp v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
143. Ryan Stephenson, Note, FederalCircuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court:
An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 272, 286-87 (2013) (stating that Federal Circuit
dissents can serve as intra-circuit splits to create the catalyst for Court review).
144. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842 (2015)
(holding that for underlying questions of fact the standard of review is clearly
erroneous not de novo).
145. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363, 1375-76 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (deciding the case solely using invalidity and infringement determinations).
146. See Oral Argument Transcript, Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No.
13-854 (U.S. argued Oct. 15, 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oralarguments/argument transcripts/13-854_p86b.pdf, Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 832-844 (2015) (demonstrating that the words "stare
decisis" were not mentioned at all in the opinion and the references to "precedent" were
regarding Rule 52 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. not the scope of the Federal Circuit's review of
its own precedent).
147. See generally Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp.,
744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (deciding the case by applying stare decisis and citing
Cybor as the precedent).
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reconsider established precedent without Supreme Court input. However, the
Supreme Court merely granted, vacated, and remanded Lighting Ballast to the
Federal Circuit in light of the decision in Teva.1 48
The Federal Circuit justified de novo review by stating that uniformity cannot be
served if the Federal Circuit must offer deference to trial judge's factual
determinations. 14 9 However, a key component of claim construction is considering
extrinsic evidence, which is surely a fact-finding task as the Court found in Teva.'so
The difference in opinion between the silent Supreme Court precedent in Marlanan
Hand the Federal Circuit's interpretation in Cybor should have served as evidence of
a split and an impetus for Supreme Court review; however, the parties in Cybor did
not petition for certiorari.'' The intra-circuit split is further highlighted by the
multiple dissents from Federal Circuit judges who believe some deference should be
offered to the fact-finding done by the district courts.' 52 The Federal Circuit is the
only appeals court that hears patent cases, so the circuit split must come from
within.' Multiple Federal Circuit judges calling for review of an established
standard should have served as a cue to the Supreme Court that the issue is ripe for
review.1 54
The Supreme Court could have granted certiorari to address the important
precedent issue: whether the Federal Circuit should reconsider its en banc Cybor
standard with another en banc decision considering the stare decisis implications. 55
The Federal Circuit is in a unique position where it is able to review its own en banc
decision with another en banc decision because of the previous lack of intervention

&

148. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 131356, 2015 WL 303220 at *1 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2015).
149. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 (addressing its belief that the Supreme Court did
not intended a "silent, third option - that claim construction may involve subsidiary or
underlying questions of fact").
150. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM.
MARY L. REv. 1791, 1832 (2013) (emphasizing that the evaluation of extrinsic
evidence appears to be a fact-finding task, though the Federal Circuit rejected the
premise); see also Teva Pharmaceuticals,135 S. Ct. at 840.
151. See SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (2010) (stating that certiorari should be granted if courts
of appeal misinterpret previous Supreme Court precedent).
152. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Amgen,
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases).
154. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (2010) (naming circuit splits as a compelling reason for a
certiorari grant from the Court).
155. See SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (2010) (mentioning again that the Supreme Court can
grant certiorari to decide questions of federal law not yet settled by the Court).
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from the Supreme Court in the preceding fifteen years. 15 6 The principle of stare
decisis clearly states that courts are bound by their previous decisions absent
intervention from a higher authority, and in this case, that intervention did not exist at
the time LightingBallastwas decided.' The Federal Circuit's purpose requires it to
adhere to this principle because ofthe court's foundation as a bastion of uniformity in
patent law and the fact that statutory decisions are given greater weight under stare
decisis.'" Since the Federal Circuit has made clear that the standard of review is de
novo, it appears that continual review of the standard by the Federal Circuit in
subsequent en banc decisions is directly contrary to the principles of horizontal stare
decisis because it questions a clearly established precedent.1 5 9 If the Federal Circuit
is allowed to reconsider an en banc decision with another en banc decision absent
Supreme Court intervention, the Federal Circuit will exceed the traditional confines
of stare decisis, which in the case of a specialized court like the Federal Circuit, is
contrary to the great weight given to precedent. 160 The Teva case has eliminated the
lack of intervention by the Supreme Court, however, the risk for the Federal Circuit
to continually review established en banc standards with new en banc cases
continues and can merely move to a new area of patent law.
The need for review from the Supreme Court is paramount. Especially in light of
the new cases that will work their way up to the Federal Circuit based on the AIA.
The intention of stare decisis is to have the Supreme Court review en banc decisions
of appeals courts and resolve splits on key legal issues.1 6 1 The Supreme Court has
previously stepped in to resolve internal divisions in the Federal Circuit, and it seems
appropriate for the Court to resolve the confusion sooner rather than later.1 62 In the
156. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 133 S. Ct. 833
(2013) (denying certiorari) (emphasizing the Supreme Court's lack of interest in
intervention on the claim construction standard of review issue).
157. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the limits on
courts under stare decisis); see also Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of
Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[S]tare decisis is a doctrine
that binds courts to follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior
tribunal.").
158. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (emphasizing that stare
decisis is more important in statutory cases because "Congress is free to change this
Court's interpretation of its legislation").
159. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th Ed. 2009) (reiterating that
precedents cannot be abandoned absent compelling reasons).
160. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1482
(2010) (noting that the rationale behind the Federal Circuit's creation elevates decisions
from the Federal Circuit to a binding precedent level).
161. See Peter S. Menell & J. Jonas Anderson, Claim Construction Catch-22: Why
the Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorariin Retractable Technologies, PATENTLYO
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/guest-postclaim5,
2012),
(Dec.
construction-catch-22-why-the-supreme-court-should-grant-certiorari-in-retractablet.html (asserting that the Supreme Court should use dissents from denials for rehearing
en bane as evidence of an intra-circuit split in the Federal Circuit).
162. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co. 535 U.S.
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past with patent law, some commentators have compared the Supreme Court to a
non-custodial parent that spends an occasional weekend with its kids. 16 3
This disinterest has, in turn, led to the Federal Circuit shaping patent law to its own
liking. The Federal Circuit first acted counter to stare decisis in 2005 when it granted
rehearing en banc in Phillips and intentionally asked the parties to brief the issue
regarding validity of the de novo standard of review for patent claim construction
knowing that the Supreme Court had not considered the issue.' 64 The Federal
Circuit was bound by the decision in Cybor, and ermneously granted rehearing en
banc on a settled issue. However, in the end its en banc decision in Phillipsto not
address the issue caused no harm. 65 If the Federal Circuit remains bound by the
Cybor case, it appears illogical that it would unilaterally reconsider the standard
under the principle of stare decisis; however, it has granted rehearing en banc twice
since Cybor.16 6 The intent of stare decisis was not to make the higher authority the
same authority that created the standard, but rather to allow superior courts to review
and adjust the law as needed.' 6 7 By reconsidering an en banc standard with another
en banc case, the Federal Circuit is contributing to uncertainty in patent law because
it creates the possibility of change when, in fact, the correct change must come from
the Supreme Court as it did in Teva.168 In the end, the Phillipscase was a hariless
example; however, the Federal Circuit gave itself another opportunity to address the
issue in the Lighting Ballastcase and came to a surprising result.
B.

Preservingthe Power ofPrecedent: Reconsidering Cybor En Banc in
Lighting Ballast.

The Lighting Ballast en banc rehearing presented a new opportunity for the
Federal Circuit to reconsider the Cybor de novo standard of review.' 69 However, it
722, 741 (2002) (resolving Federal Circuit confusion on prosecution history estoppel
among other issues).
163. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation
and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 28, 28 (2007) (implying that the
Supreme Court does not pay sufficient attention to resolving patent law issues).
164. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting
rehearing en bane and listing seven issues for the parties to brief).
165. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(deciding the case without addressing Cybor).
166. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 Fed.
App'x 951, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting rehearing en bane); Phillips 376 F.3d at
1382-83 (granting rehearing en bane).
167. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (asserting that horizontal stare
decisis binds courts to their prior decisions which should preclude the Federal Circuit
from even granting rehearing en bane of settled law).
168. See Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716 (1888) ("A question arising . .
cannot be regarded as judicially settled when it has not been so settled by the highest
judicial authority which can pass upon the question.").
169. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (considering only the validity of Cybor and ignoring the
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also presented a new opportunity for the Federal Circuit to act contrary to the
principle of stare decisis by reconsidering established precedent without input from a
higher authority given the weight Federal Circuit en banc decisions carry. 7 0 Judge
Taranto recognized this concern in the oral argument for Lighting Ballast en banc
when he questioned the attorneys as to the ability of the Federal Circuit to even
consider a change of the Cybor standard under stare decisis, and the attorneys had no
answer.' 7 ' Judge Taranto astutely recognized by implication that allowing the
Federal Circuit to reconsider its own en banc standards absent intervention from a
higher authority runs counter to the principle of stare decisis, which, in turn, runs
counter to the purpose of the Federal Circuit as a court of unifonnity and
consistency.1 72 The other judges in the case did not mention stare decisis at all;
however, in an interesting twist the issue of stare decisis carried the day.1 73
The en banc decision, written by Judge Newman, based its reasoning heavily on
the importance of stare decisis.1 7 4 Judge Newman argued that unless a development
in judicial doctrine or an action by Congress reduced the conceptual underpinning of
a standard, it should not be overMled.1'7 Judge Newman also recognized the
importance of stare decisis in creating consistency in patent law, which was a key
reason the Federal Circuit was created in the first place.' 76 Judge Taranto joined the
majority opinion and together the majority reaffirmed Cybor under the principle of
stare decisis.1 77 In this instance, the Federal Circuit acted correctly in reaffirming the
Cybor standard under stare decisis. 78
However, this decision assumes that under stare decisis the Federal Circuit should
rehear cases en banc on established precedent in the first place.1 79 Judge Taranto
indicated as much in the oral argument when one of the attorneys responded that the

actual patent validity or infringement questions).
170. See Dobbins, supra note 160, at 1482 (demonstrating the Federal Circuit's
belief that it creates binding precedent even on other circuits despite the issue not being
so clear cut).
171. See Anderson, supra note 99 (noting that Judge Taranto's effort on the stare
decisis issue was persistent).
172. See id. (showing Judge Lourie's concern with the effects an overrule of Cybor
would have on national uniformity).
173. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC, 744 F.3d at 1281-86 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(remarking on the importance of applying stare decisis stressed by the Supreme Court).
174. See id. (citing large amounts of case law on stare decisis).
175. See id. at 1281-82 (presenting an interesting interpretation considering the lack
of discussion on stare decisis at oral argument).
176. See id. at 1282 (echoing the concerns of Congress when it established the
Federal Circuit).
177. See id. at 1285 (holding that Cybor was still workable therefore concluding it
should not be overruled).
178. See id. (noting the court was bound by its prior precedents).
179. See id. (noting that the criteria for overruling Cybor were not met here which
implies the court could overrule its own en banc standard in the first place).
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court can review any case en banc at its discretion.so The dissent takes the view
farther by arguing that the Federal Circuit can abrogate its own case law if it is
wrongly decided, at odds with Congressional mandates, or has harmful
consequences.' 8 ' However, each of the examples the dissent cites involves the
reconsideration of panel decisions, not of established en banc precedents. 82 If the
court truly intends to adhere to stare decisis and recognize its importance, it is
difficult to understand why it reconsiders these cases en banc at all because the literal
definition of stare decisis appears to contradict this action."
The reality is that any change in the Cybor standard without a ruling from the
Supreme Court or a direct change in the law would have placed the Federal Circuit
in a position of great power because it would allow the Federal Circuit to mold
patent law unchecked as a pseudo-court of last resort.' 84 While the Supreme Court
may not enjoy or fully understand patent law, its role in the development of patent
law is essential.'
The grant of certiorari in Teva Pharameceuticalsaddressing the de novo review
issue, essentially destroyed any chance that LightingBallast will be reviewed for the
stare decisis implications. The Court established as much when it granted, vacated,
and remanded Lighting Ballast in light of Teva.' 8 6 The primary need was for the
Court to recognize the importance of the stare decisis implications, which Teva fails
to address because it came from a panel decision, and to make the interplay between
the two courts clear.

180. See Oral Argument at 21:54, 55:53, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips
Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), available at
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2012-1014_9132013.mp3
(capturing Judge Taranto stating his belief that the court has the ability to review en
bane standards with other en banc cases).
181. See Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1315 (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (citing to
multiple cases where Federal Circuit precedent was abrogated or overruled).
182. Cf id. (providing examples of only panel cases does not address the
overarching issue on the reach of the Federal Circuit in overruling en bane standards
with new en bane cases).
183. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (using the idea that higher
authorities should review lower authorities to imply the Federal Circuit cannot rereview its own en banc decisions).
184. See Chu, supra note 133, at 1351 (emphasizing that the possibility for great
power for the Federal Circuit exists because of the lack of Supreme Court review).
185. See Dyk, supra note 9, at 763 (recognizing the importance of the Supreme
Court to patent law but also recognizing that Supreme Court involvement is disliked by
the Patent Bar).
186. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 131356, 2015 WL 303220 at *1 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2015).
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Disuniform, Uncertain, and All-Powerful: The Federal Circuit'sRole
ifEn Banc Decisions are OverruledEn Banc.
Two distinct questions exist if the Federal Circuit is permitted to reconsider
previously-established en banc standards absent intervention from a higher authority:
(1) what type of interplay exists between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
for stare decisis purposes; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit's expertise as the
primary judicial entity for patent law grants the Federal Circuit certain flexibility in
choosing when to apply stare decisis.
Academics have long presented varying views of the proper relationship between
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.' 87 Professor Jonas Anderson envisions
the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit as a dialogic
relationship where the Supreme Court issues broad policy decisions that can spur the
Federal Circuit to action.'8 However, this relationship presents a problem because it
vests primary decision-making power in the Federal Circuit.' 89 Under Professor
Anderson's model, the Federal Circuit is the epicenter of action and development in
patent law while the Supreme Court serves to correct the Federal Circuit without
providing specific guidance on how to correct problems.1 90 Essentially, this model
diminishes the importance of vertical stare decisis and the institutional role of the
Supreme Court to say what the law means.'91
As the court of last resort, the Supreme Court's role must extend beyond merely
stating the policy and must include enunciating some means that the Federal Circuit
can use to develop patent law.' 92 By providing the Federal Circuit with decisionC.

187. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 284 (2002) (envisioning a model
where the Federal Circuit signals important cases for Supreme Court review); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (claiming the Supreme Court has
allowed the Federal Circuit to essentially define and alter patent law).
188. See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1083 (2014)
(noting that a dialogic relationship exists despite the Federal Circuit being the most
reversed federal court).
189. See id. at 1066 (discussing the deference given by the Supreme Court to the
Federal Circuit due to its expertise).
190. See id. at 1079-80 (providing examples of the Supreme Court spurring the
Federal Circuit to act).
191. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
192. See Eric Black, How the Supreme Court has Come to Play a Policymaking
2012),
http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black(Nov.
20,
MrNNPOST
Role,
ink/2012/I 1/how-supreme-court-has-come-play-policymaking-role (arguing that the
Supreme Court is not as adept at creating useful patent rules and has developed a
policy-making role normally saved for elected officials). But See John M. Golden, The
Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Review of
Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA. L. REV. 657, 674-84 (arguing the Supreme Court

is not as adept to creating useful patent rules).
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making power on the means, it creates a pseudo-court of last resort.'93 The Federal
Circuit can hardly meet its mission of stability and uniformity in patent law when the
Supreme Court leaves it to figure out the means for developing effective patent
doctrine from broad policy pronouncements.' 9 4 The Federal Circuit would be left in
a more powerful position and indeed a more controversial position as a pseudo-court
of last resort where politics and composition could play a role like in the Supreme
Court.1 95

The Supreme Court and Congress consider the Federal Circuit the expert on
patent law because of its unique jurisdiction for hearing appeals in all patent cases.' 96
This expertise is used to explain the necessity of allowing the Federal Circuit to
operate as the primary actor in shaping the future of patent law.1 97 Furthermore, the
argument persists that the expertise provides a greater incentive to give deference to
the Federal Circuit's judgment when it comes to the development of patent law.' 98
The problem is that stare decisis must weigh heavily on a court founded on the
principle of uniformity like the Federal Circuit.1 99 The Federal Circuit faced the
unique issue of having an en banc precedent that the Supreme Court ignored for over
fifteen years.20 0 This same situation can arise again in a different area of patent law.
One other argument is that if other courts of appeal can, albeit infrequently,
change binding precedents, why can't the Federal Circuit? The reason is that the
Federal Circuit can face a pure absence of higher authority intervention before

193. See Chu, supra note 133, at 1351 (cautioning that the Federal Circuit could
become a pseudo-court of last resort).
194. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 2 (1981) (voicing the idea that the entire purpose of
the Federal Circuit was to create a central venue for patent claims that would enable
uniform interpretation of the substantive patent law in all courts).
195. See Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts is Most Conservative in Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html;
William Laney, Is There a Liberal Supreme Court in Our Foreseeable Future?, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2013 1:57 PM), http//www.huffingtonpost.com/Williamlaney/is-there-a-liberal-supreme-court_b_3755839.html (demonstrating how the media
views the polarization of the Supreme Court).
196. See Anderson, supra note 188, at 1068 (noting that Congress intended the
Federal Circuit to be the primary policymaker on patents because of its role in
interpreting the patent law).
197. See id. at 1067-68 (referring to the prominent role the Federal Circuit plays in
the judicial dialogue because of expertise).
198. See id. at 1071-74 (stating that Congress removed reform provisions from
patent legislation because of Federal Circuit case law).
199. See Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that uniformity and
consistency, bolstered by stare decisis, were the factors Congress considered in creating
the Federal Circuit).
200. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 133 S. Ct. 833
(2013) (denying certiorari); AWH Corp. v. Phillips, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006) (denying
certiorari).
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changing the standard, which is contrary to stare decisis. 20' In most instances, under
vertical stare decisis, a change in the law or opinion from the Supreme Court or
Congress will allow a court of appeal to revisit its prior precedent and adjust or
overrule it as needed.202 However, the lack of review from a higher authority before
Teva precluded the reconsideration of Cybor under stare decisis as the judges aptly
noted in Lighting Ballast.203 The Federal Circuit certainly believes it has the ability
to reconsider en banc standards with new en banc cases as it noted in Lighting
Ballast.204 Despite the strong adherence to stare decisis, the Federal Circuit neglects
the fact that a consistent application of stare decisis would prevent the Federal Circuit
from reconsidering the standard because contention alone is not sufficient to justify
review of established precedent. 205
The policy behind the creation of the Federal Circuit was to promote consistency
in patent law. 206 The Federal Circuit acted contrary to its policy mandate by
accepting new en banc reviews of the Cybor decision absent higher authority
intervention because the standard was established by the en banc decision in
Cybor.207 It is was up to the Supreme Court to take the next step.208 Unfortunately,
in granting certiorari for Teva, the Supreme Court dismissed an opportunity to
discuss the stare decisis implications. By eroding the value of precedent, the Federal
Circuit could cheapen the very foundation of the American legal system, which is, in
part, based on using firmly established precedent as a guidepost for the limits of
decisions. 209

201. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting that special
justifications are needed to reverse precedent).
202. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States,
12 NEv. L.J. 787, 811 (2012) (explaining that the Federal Circuit is bound by its own
precedent until overruled by the Supreme Court).
203. See Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1283 (citing Festo in stating that courts must
be cautious before disrupting settled expectations in the law).
204. See id. at 1283-84 (discussing reasons why the court should not overrule
Cybor based on unworkability, meaning the court considered it could overrule if
needed).
205. See Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82 (2007) (emphasizing that
contention within the court does not re-open a case for another try).
206. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 2 (1981) (reemphasizing the important nature of
uniformity to patent law because of the effects on the public participating in
commerce).
207. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (holding that the
affirmance of the Federal Circuit's Markman I decision was an endorsement of the de
novo standard of review for claim construction).
208. See Menell & Anderson, supra note 161 (considering the issue of the patent
claim construction standard of review as ripe for Supreme Court review since Markman
was decided).
209. See MICHAEL I. HERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 148 (2008) (stating
that precedents provide a framework for judicial decision-making).
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D. Stare Indecisis From the Courtroom to the Boardroom:Negative
Effects on Business
If the Federal Circuit is permitted to continually reconsider en banc decisions with
other en banc decisions absent intervention, the uncertainty can create great risks for
business. 2 10 Businesses have become very hesitant to enter into patent litigation
because of its exorbitant costs, and the costs could increase if the Federal Circuit can
change the standard for claim construction at will.2 11 Business planning and strategy
is typically done by lawyers and executives far ahead of time and is based on finding
patterns and trends that are certain and can be easily applied. 212 For example, if the
Federal Circuit were to shift a standard twice over a 10-year peniod, businesses will
undoubtedly find themselves constantly re-planning to accommodate the evershifting patent claim construction standards. The uncertainty in the patent law is also
likely to drive up costs when patent litigation is already costing between five hundred
thousand and three million dollars per suit.2 13
Furthermore, businesses may be enticed to give up on patent litigation all together
and instead focus on avoiding long litigation through settlement.214 The threat of
multiple en banc courts reconsidering the same issues undoubtedly creates confusion
regarding the true meaning of the law, which, in turn, creates confusion for
businesses because lawyers must have consistent standards to advise clients on
litigation matters. 215 1he logical question that follows is: if the law is not broken,
why would the court reconsider it? NPEs may thrive in this scenario because
businesses will not be enticed to challenge these small non-practicing patent holders
with appeals to the Federal Circuit when no prediction can be made as to how the
court may rule since the law over time will become extremely muddled over time.216
210. Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictabilityin Patent Litigation:
The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, J. INTELL. PROP. L.
175, 175 (2001) ("Corporations, in-house counsel and even trial litigators require
certainty and predictability in order to develop products, businesses, and litigation
strategies.").
211.' See Thier, supra note 59 (noting the existing high costs of patent litigation
with room for growth due to technological improvements and developments).
212. See Bender, supra note 210, at 175 (emphasizing that certainty fuels business
because businesses want a strong idea of value of an investment beforehand).
213. See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Prospectsfor Improving U.S. Patent Quality via
Post-grant Opposition, NAT'L BUREAU OF EcON. RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER No.
9731 8 (2003), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W973l.pdf (noting that the
cost can be higher or lower depending on the risk present).
214. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84
WASH. L. REV. 237, 243 (2006) (stating that high litigation costs lead to settlements
that are unfavorable yet preferable to the exorbitant litigation costs).
215. See Bender, supra note 210, at 175 (implying that certainty fuels investment
by business, without one the other will decrease as well).
216. See Schumer, supra note 60 (reiterating that NPEs already cost businesses
large amounts of money per year and uncertainty at the Federal Circuits could lead to
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With patents steadily becoming a bigger and bigger part of corporate portfolios,
inconsistent applications of law or uncertainty acts contrary to business objectives
and may reduce interest in patents over time.217
Finally, businesses facing inconsistency or uncertainty in patent law are exactly
what Congress attempted to avoid when it created the Federal Circuit.21 8 Congress
understood the growing role of patents in the American economy and sought to
make patent litigation easier because patent law would be uniform and centralized. 219
Businesses prefer predictability because it reduces volatility and risk both of which
are important strategic considerations. 2 20 Congress recognized the importance of
strong business strategies and the negative effects of inconsistent patent law. 221 That
being said, with threats to the uniformity of patent law, neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress have stepped up, and the confusion and uncertainty have lingered long
enough.
III. STEPPING TO THE PLATE: ADDRESSING THE CONTROVERSY BEFORE IT
HAS A CHANCE TO BEGIN.

The issue of the Federal Circuit reconsidering en banc standards with new en banc
cases needs to be addressed before it can become a major issue. Two possible
solutions exist: (1) the Supreme Court makes a determination as to when the Federal
Circuit may reconsider en banc precedents when the Supreme Court has not
intervened and (2) Congress intervenes to clarify whether its intent for the Federal
Circuit included de novo review.
The Federal Circuit had an opportunity in LightingBallast to clarify its position on
reconsidering established en banc standards. While stare decisis ultimately carried
the day in the Lighting Ballast case, the Federal Circuit maintained its ability to
review established en banc standards en banc without explanation. The Federal
Circuit placed great emphasis on stare decisis in its reasoning for adhering to Cybor
but did not explain why it reconsidered Cybor in LightingBallast en banc in the first
place. The panel decision in Lighting Ballast was sufficient to support Cybor under
stare decisis and the proper avenue was to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.

more costly settlements).
217. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 163 (arguing that the business community could
work just fine without a patent system because the Tribunal Courts are overworked
with limited amount of judges because the system wants uniformity).
218. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 2 (1981) (emphasizing the need for national
uniformity in the patent law).
219. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 2 (1981) (noting that centralizing the patent law
would fuel innovation and investment).
220. See Martin Reeves et al, Your Strategy Needs a Strategy, HARVARD Bus. REV.,
(September 2012), http://www.hbr.org/2012/09/your-strategy-needs-a-strategy/ar/1
(naming predictability as one of two key factors in any business strategy).
221. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 6 (1981) (stating that the decentralized nature of the
patent law at the time had already discouraged innovation).
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Regardless of its actual actions, the potential of allowing the Federal Circuit to
clarify its own reach in reconsidering the established en banc standard is troublesome
because an issue of law is not tmuly decided until the highest authorities intervene. If
the Federal Circuit decided in Lighting Ballast or decides later that it can reconsider
and overrule en banc decisions with other en banc decisions at whim, a great amount
of power would vest in that court. However, there is no need to let the Federal
Circuit enter that quagmire. If the Supreme Court decides the question of the reach
ofthe Federal Circuit first, the issue will finally be laid to rest.
As the court of last resort in this country, it is the Supreme Court's duty to resolve
splits in the law. Even though the Federal Circuit did not overrule Cybor in Lighting
Ballast, the Supreme Court should consider the question of whether the Federal
Circuit has the ability to continually reconsider established precedent in order to
protect the principle of stare decisis. The Supreme Court has consistently supported
the application of precedent by the lower courts and by itself. The Federal Circuit's
attempt to act contrary to that principle is an affront to the Supreme Court's history of
supporting strong precedent. The issue will not be truly resolved unless the Supreme
Court definitively states how far an en banc Federal Circuit can go in reconsidering
its previous en banc decisions absent intervention from the Court or Congress. The
Supreme Court should focus narrowly on the Federal Circuit since it is the only
appeals court in the unique situation where the higher authorities have not intervened
in over fifteen years. The Supreme Court already gave up an opportunity to consider
this important issue fully in Lighting Ballast by granting, vacating, and remanding
the Federal Circuit's decision, which essentially determines it will not consider the
case fully.
The Supreme Court's choice to take the very narrow route of simply choosing a
side on the patent claim construction standard of review debate in the Teva case did
not go far enought. The benefits of this approach were twofold: it eliminated the
confusion with regard to patent claim construction and it temporarily eliminated the
threat of acting contrary to the principles of stare decisis. The primary problem with
this approach is that the relief to the stare decisis problem is not definitive. The claim
construction issues was solved, yet, the overarching issue of the Federal Circuit
reconsidering established en banc decisions absent intervention remains.
Certainly en banc standards that stand for more than fifteen years without
intervention are rare; however, that does not mean contention over established
standards cannot occur again. Businesses will benefit from a clear statement of the
claim construction standard of review because uniformity and consistency would be
restored. However, businesses may also suffer in the end should the Federal Circuit
later assert an authority to overrule en banc standards with other en banc decisions in
the absence of Supreme Court intervention in future cases.
Either way, the legal system would benefit from clarity. Clarity with a final
decision on the proper patent claim construction standard of review is helpful but not
definitive. True clarity comes from the Supreme Court accepting its responsibility as
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the bastion of the American legal system by making a determination on the Federal
Circuit's use of stare decisis. The benefits to stare decisis, patent law, uniformity
principles, and the role of the courts will all be met with a clear pronouncement on
how courts should operate.
CONCLUSION
Challenging the Cybor patent claim construction standard of review has become
an issue for the Federal Circuit. The previous lack of intervention from the Supreme
Court or Congress put the Federal Circuit in a position to continually reconsider or
overmle its own en banc standards with new en banc decisions. This type of
unilateral power in the Federal Circuit runs contrary to the guiding legal principle of
stare decisis. In a commercial field like patents, businesses are being unfairly
subjected to unnecessary uncertainty and disuniformity in the law because courts
have failed to either limit themselves or definitively state the law. Lighting Ballast
was a missed opportunity to definitively answer the important stare decisis questions
in the Federal Circuit. Stare indecisis cannot become the new norm in the Federal
Circuit because businesses and the legal community deserve the clarity that has
eluded them for too long.

